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Marc J. R. Broekema, Niek Strohmaier, Jan A. A. Adriaanse, and Jean-Pierre I. van der Rest
Leiden University
ABSTRACT
Business valuations of the same company made by different valuators frequently diverge,
resulting in lengthy and costly disputes. This paper takes a novel approach in explaining
inconsistencies in business valuations by adopting a psychological perspective and offering
a first investigation into the role of cognitive biases in valuations. In two experimental stud-
ies (N¼ 331) we show that valuators can be affected by both anchoring bias and engage-
ment bias (i.e., being affected by a client’s interests). These findings cast doubt on the
notion of fair value and demonstrate the importance of recognizing the psychology of busi-
ness valuations. Our contribution is timely considering the current COVID-19 pandemic and
its aftermath in which accurate valuations will be paramount, but also extremely complex







Business valuations are a key component of many
business transactions. Consider for example a company
that wants to acquire another company or sell a sub-
sidiary. In both instances the value of the target com-
pany needs to be determined. Or consider a dispute
between shareholders who decide to separate as a
result. It is then necessary to determine the value
of the shares to allow for these to be transferred.
Likewise, when a company experiences financial dis-
tress and is facing bankruptcy, a valuator may need to
determine whether the company’s going-concern value
– after a restructuring and/or turnaround – is higher
than its liquidation value, as such that a comparison is
used to assess whether it makes economic sense to res-
cue the company (e.g., through debt restructuring). As
many businesses are currently on the edge of bank-
ruptcy or have already entered insolvency proceedings,
this last example will become increasingly prevalent in
the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. It will be
of utmost importance that liquidation value and
going-concern value after restructuring and/or turn-
around are accurately assessed, to ensure for all
stakeholders that the unnecessary further loss of eco-
nomic value is minimized.
A company’s or asset’s value is derived from
expectations regarding its future earnings. Therefore,
valuation theory is predominately focused on the con-
cept of capitalizing or discounting future earnings
(Edwards and Warman 1981; Fisher 1930; Parker
1968; Rutterford 2004). Although there are different
valuation methods (see for example Brealey, Myers,
and Allen 2008; Damodaran 2006; Koller, Goedhart,
and Wessels 2015), a widely accepted and common
valuation method is the Discounted Cash Flow
method (i.e., DCF; Dittmann, Maug, and Kemper
2004; Fernandez 2007; Mukherjee, Kiymaz, and Baker
2004; Pereiro 2002). The DCF-method knows different
variants1 and consists of two main variables. The first
variable concerns the company’s estimated future
earnings, predominately expressed in the free cash
flows (i.e., cash that is not required for operations or
reinvestments; Brealey, Myers, and Allen 2008; Jensen
1986).2 The second variable concerns the ‘discount
rate’ that reflects the riskiness of the estimated free
cash flows. When these two variables are known, the
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application of a relatively simple equation calculates
the present value of a company.
The DCF-valuation methodology is, at first sight, a
simple and elegant solution to calculate the future
value of a company discounted to its present value.
However, practice demonstrates that when two or
more business valuators value the same company (and
assuming all things are equal), different valuation out-
comes can emerge. Minor differences in valuation
outcomes are to some extent inevitable due to the
application of different assumptions in the valuation
framework and are generally accepted as an inherent
consequence of using the DCF-method. However,
large differences are problematic and difficult to
explain. For example, in 2016 the Delaware Court of
Chancery in the US published its opinion in the
Dell Inc. statutory appraisal action (Memorandum
Opinion: Appriasal of Dell Inc., 2016), which arose
out of the 2013 management buyout led by the com-
pany’s founder, Michael Dell. He and an investor
acquired Dell for USD 13,96 per share. Some share-
holders did not agree with the defined price and
started an appraisal proceeding. The petitioners’
expert used a DCF-analysis to opine that the company
had a fair value of USD 28,61 per share on the
closing date, while the respondents’ expert used a
DCF-analysis to opine that the company had a fair
value of USD 12,68 per share on the closing date.
Hence, two highly respected valuation experts, applying
the same valuation principles, generated opinions that
differed by 126%, or approximately USD 28 billion.
Extensive disputes around valuation outcomes are
detrimental as ultimately the valuation object’s value
can be affected by the time and attention a dispute
demands. Additionally, strong deviations in assump-
tions may result in an under- or overvaluation of a
company, especially in times of high uncertainty,
which influences the quality and soundness of invest-
ment decisions (i.e., buy or sell), as well as contribute
to potential capital destruction. More pressingly at the
moment, unsound business valuations in the context
of insolvency risks further destroy economic value if
inherently viable companies are unnecessarily liqui-
dated, or, contrastingly, when significant resources are
allocated to saving companies with limited prospects
to survive. Hence, in order minimize differences in
valuation outcomes and thus prevent or at least limit
valuation disputes and economic loss of value, the
ultimate question is: what causes differences in valu-
ation outcomes?
One cause that has been put forward is that valua-
tors disagree on how to estimate the parameters and
inputs when using the DCF-method, in part due to a
lack of clear guidelines (Bancel and Mittoo 2014). On
top of that, consistency in the valuation process
appears to be lacking (Dukes 2001). However, it is
unlikely that large differences in valuation outcomes
(such as in the Dell case) can solely be accounted for
by these issues, which is why we consider the further
exploration of potential causes of large differences in
valuation outcomes a worthwhile pursuit. We do this
by adopting a novel approach, focusing on the psy-
chological processes surrounding business valuations.
More specifically, the key focus of the current article
is the potential influence cognitive biases might have
on business valuations and the evaluations thereof.
Considering the inherent complexity of valuations,
the lack of clear guidelines, as well as the time-pressure
under which valuations are usually conducted (condi-
tions that allow for biases to emerge; Tversky and
Kahneman 1974), it could be that valuations are vul-
nerable to the influence of cognitive biases (e.g.,
Damodaran 2009, 2017). Surprisingly, however, despite
the numerous studies that have been conducted investi-
gating the role of heuristics and biases in judgment
and decision making in a wide range of (financial) con-
texts, the valuation domain has unfortunately (and to
our knowledge) not yet been subjected to this type of
research. The current research aims to fill this gap
in the literature and provide the first empirical
investigation into the potential influence of cognitive
biases in business valuations, thereby possibly offering
an explanation for the significant differences in valu-
ation outcomes.
Heuristics and biases
Already in the early seventies of the last century,
research of Tversky and Kahneman (1974) revealed
the powerful effects of heuristics and biases on human
judgments, particularly in situations characterized by
high degrees of complexity and uncertainty. Since
then, ample research has firmly established the per-
suasive influence of biases on human judgment, also
in a financial context. For example, it has been estab-
lished that financial decisions are plagued by overcon-
fidence on behalf of decision makers (e.g., Ferris,
Jayaraman, and Sabherwal 2013; Ho et al. 2016), that
investment strategies are typically affected by over-
optimism (e.g., Wang, Sheng, and Yang 2013), and
that the similarity between startup teams and venture
capitalists can affect the latter’s investment decisions,
such that teams that are perceived as more similar are
more likely to receive funding (Franke et al. 2006;
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Murnieks et al. 2011). Importantly, however, to our
knowledge no empirical research has been conducted
investigating the influence of biases on business valua-
tions. This lacuna is surprising considering (1) the
vast amount of research conducted on biases in other
areas of financial decision making, and (2) the central
role that the concept of economic value plays in cor-
porate disputes, mergers and acquisitions, other
investment decisions, and in insolvency proceedings.
The current research investigates the potential influ-
ence of two biases. The first is the anchoring and
adjustment bias, which entails the tendency to use an
initial piece of information as an anchor and subse-
quently adjust insufficiently away from that (largely
irrelevant) anchor. The second bias under investiga-
tion in this study is a bias we call “engagement bias”,
which entails the possibility that valuators (or any
professional for that matter) are affected by their cli-
ents’ interests. We will now elaborate further on both
biases and end each section with our hypothesis of
how the particular bias might affect valuators.
Anchoring and adjustment bias
The anchoring and adjustment bias, also called the
anchoring effect or anchoring bias, is usually concep-
tualized as the intuitive tendency of humans to use an
initial piece of, predominately insufficient and irrele-
vant, information in formulating their final judgment
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974). In their seminal paper,
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) asked participants in an
experiment to estimate (among other things) the per-
centage of African countries in the United Nations
(UN). By spinning a wheel of fortune, participants
were first presented with a number between 0 and 100
and were asked to indicate whether or not the number
determined by spinning the wheel was higher or lower
than their estimate of the percentage of African coun-
tries in the UN. Next, the partakers were requested to
adjust the number generated by the wheel of fortune
upwards or downwards to arrive at their estimate of
the percentage of African countries in the UN. The
results showed that the arbitrary numbers (from spin-
ning the wheel) had an effect on the participants esti-
mates, such that if the wheel landed on 10 the average
estimate was 25% while if the wheel landed on 60 the
average was 45%. Hence, even with full awareness of
the randomness and irrelevance of the numbers gener-
ated by the wheel of fortune, participants’ estimates
were still affected by these anchors. Once an anchor is
presented, humans tend to adjust insufficiently away
from that anchor, resulting in judgments that are closer
to the anchor than in the absence of that anchor
(Heywood-Smith, Welsh, and Begg 2008; Russo and
Schoemaker 1992; Tversky and Kahneman 1992).
Anchoring bias poses a particularly great risk in
the context of business valuation, as valuators are fre-
quently confronted which numerical estimates of a
company’s value that may serve as an anchor and sub-
sequently bias the valuator’s own estimates. For
example, when a business valuator is requested to
value a company that his/her client wants to acquire
and informs the valuator about the maximum price
he is willing to pay, that maximum prize as men-
tioned by the valuator’s client can serve as an anchor.
When a court requests a business valuator to deter-
mine the economic damages as a result of an unlawful
act by one of the parties and the valuator is informed
on the amount the claimant had requested earlier,
that initial amount can serve as an anchor. Also,
when a business owner on the brink of bankruptcy
engages a valuator to determine the company’s going-
concern (in most cases after restructuring and/or
turnaround) or liquidation value, the current owner
might be convinced that the company is still worth at
least a certain amount. Hence, business valuators fre-
quently operate under conditions in which they are
confronted with anchors, which may then affect their
judgment, ultimately risking poor and costly finan-
cial decisions.
To what extent business valuator might indeed be
affected by anchoring bias currently remains an open
question. On the one hand, extensive research has
been conducted on anchoring bias since the original
research by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), and the
vast amount of evidence across different contexts sug-
gests it is one of the most robust biases (for a review,
see Furnham and Boo 2011). Moreover, the anchoring
bias appears not to be limited to lay-people’s judg-
ments, as research has shown that professionals (e.g.,
financial market experts, auditors, legal professionals)
can be affected by anchoring bias as well when making
judgments relevant to their respective fields (Englich
2006; Kaustia, Alho, and Puttonen 2008; Kinney Jr. and
Uecker 1982; Liao, Chou, and Chiu 2013).
On the other hand, however, there is some research
that suggests professionals in settings that are familiar
to them rely less on anchors in their judgments. For
example, Kaustia, Alho, and Puttonen (2008) found
that financial professionals were less affected by the
initial value of stocks (i.e., the anchor) when estimat-
ing long-term stock returns than students were.
Likewise, Wilson et al. (1996) found that people with
more knowledge of a particular subject matter were
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less susceptible to anchoring bias. Thus, although the
vast majority of research suggests being an expert in a
certain field is insufficient to be protected from
anchoring effects, there is some evidence that sug-
gests otherwise.
Notwithstanding the discussed research pointing
toward an ‘expert effect’ that might protect experts (to
an extent) against anchoring effects, based on the
robustness of the anchoring bias and its presence in a
variety of domains, we suspect that valuators are
affected in their judgments by the anchoring bias.
Therefore, we formulated the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Valuators are affected by anchoring
bias when judging the value of a company, such that
they will determine a higher value following a high
anchor and a lower value following a low anchor.
We believe it is important to investigate the pos-
sible risk of anchoring bias in valuators’ judgments
because of the particularly dire consequences of this
bias in this context. If evidence for anchoring bias is
indeed found among valuators, stakeholders of busi-
ness valuations (e.g., entrepreneurs, valuators, courts)
ought to take note of this, take this risk seriously, and
devote attention to mitigating the risk this bias poses.
Hence, the contribution of investigating this hypoth-
esis lies predominantly in increasing awareness among
practitioners of how anchoring bias might be an
important factor in causing valuation disputes and
economic and societal damage.
Engagement bias
When business valuators (or any professionals for that
matter) are (consciously or unconsciously) affected in
their judgments such that these favor their clients’
interests, we call this engagement bias. Business valua-
tors support a variety of clients for different purposes
and are exposed to the demands, wishes, and desires
of their clients. Competition between professionals to
attract and retain clients can be fierce, and conse-
quently, in order to sustain good relationships with
their clients the continuous pursuit by professionals to
achieve their clients’ satisfaction is not unusual. We
therefore ask the question whether in professional
engagements the drive to satisfy clients jeopardizes
professional autonomy and unconsciously affects
supposedly unbiased and objective judgments.
Acknowledging the risk that valuators might be sus-
ceptible to engagement bias is important, as the possi-
bility exists that clients’ interests are somehow
factored into business valuations at the expense of
focusing solely on valuation theories and the
principles of the profession. Moreover, engagement
bias risks obfuscating important valuation judgments,
which can ultimately lead to lengthy and costly dis-
putes, as well as significant economic and soci-
etal damage.
Even though there is no empirical evidence for the
existence of engagement bias in the important context
of business valuation, there is reason to believe that
professionals weigh their clients’ interests at the
expense of their professional judgment. For example,
following from, among other things, the public debate
about the dependence of auditors on their clients,
auditors are nowadays monitored more closely by
supervising bodies and regulatory authorities to pre-
vent them from taking their clients’ interests too
much into account. This increased monitoring and
the mandatory rotation of audit firms is a conse-
quence of a sequence of auditing scandals where audi-
tors were blamed for tarnishing their responsibilities
and their role in society and business by weighing the
interests of their clients too much in audits. Such
measures suggest there is a concern that professionals
are biased in their judgments following from the focus
on achieving customer satisfaction. Indeed, in an
impactful paper, Bazerman, Morgan, and Loewenstein
(1997) argue that complete auditor independence is
actually impossible due to the many unconscious psy-
chological processes that bias even the most sin-
cere auditors.
Since then, this notion has been put to the test and
research has demonstrated that auditors’ judgments
can be impacted by pressure stemming from client
management. For example, Kadous, Kennedy, and
Peecher (2003) find that auditors are more likely to
defend and advocate for a particular (aggressive)
accounting method when doing so is in line with their
clients’ preferences, and this congruency is amplified
when auditors have to assess and discuss the quality
of the used method with an external committee (see
also Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996; Koch and Salterio
2017). Their work draws from the theory of motivated
reasoning, which in essence entails that people can be
unconsciously motivated to arrive at a certain conclu-
sion, all the while being under the illusion of acting
objectively (e.g., Hughes and Zaki 2015; Kunda 1990;
Sood 2013; Sood and Darley 2012). Once a certain
goal outcome is activated, people will subsequently
interpret and analyze information in a way that is
consistent with this desired outcome, particularly
when the situation at hand is rather ambiguous and
thus allows for multiple interpretations. It is import-
ant to emphasize that such a biased sense-making
4 M. J. R. BROEKEMA ET AL.
process is not an intentional or conscious process,
and can therefore affect even those with the most sin-
cere intentions.
Based on the same notion of motivated reasoning,
Moore et al. (2003) find that when they ask partici-
pants to adopt the role of an auditor, the participants’
judgments of a company’s value are affected by
whether they are representing the seller in a transaction
or the buyer. In an attempt to mitigate the observed
effects, they motivated participants (using financial
incentives) to not be affected by their affiliation with
either the buyer or the seller, but this did not have any
effect, highlighting the automaticity and pervasiveness
of such motivated reasoning processes (see also Church
et al. 2015; Koch, Weber, and W€ustemann 2012;
Moore, Tanlu, and Bazerman 2010).
In addition to the evidence for engagement bias
among auditors, there is also evidence for this bias in
other financial judgments. A recent study investigated
whether business relations between mutual funds and
brokerage firms influences sell-side analyst recommen-
dations, and found that brokerage firm analysts’ stock
recommendations are in fact higher if the stock is
held by mutual fund clients of the brokerage firm
(Firth et al. 2013). Interestingly, this phenomenon
strengthened when the weight of the stock in the
mutual fund clients’ portfolio increased and also when
the amount of trading commissions paid by the
mutual fund clients increased.
Thus, there is evidence that suggests that financial
professionals can be biased in their judgments resulting
from the dependent relationships with their clients.
Whether this also holds true within the context of busi-
ness valuation however remains an open question. That
is, some of the research on auditor independence thus
far has not involved professional auditors as partici-
pants and there is evidence that auditors with higher
levels of expertise are actually less seduced by conflicts
of interest in their decision-making (Guiral et al. 2015).
Moreover, there is evidence that bias stemming from
client pressure is neutralized when auditors experience
social pressure to conform to norms set by professio-
nals groups they belong to (King 2002). Combined,
these findings indicate that experienced valuators with
strong ties to their professional affiliations may be able
to resist pressure stemming from clients. Nonetheless,
based on the review of the extant literature, we formu-
lated the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Valuators are affected by engagement
bias when judging the value of a company, such that
they will value a valuation object in accordance with
their clients’ interests.
We consider this to be an important hypothesis
to investigate, in particular because of the potential
implications for practitioners. Whereas the auditing
landscape is being relatively tightly regulated and is
under continuous scrutiny of policy makers, the
domain of business valuation has not yet seen similar
regulatory efforts. In fact, the field currently remains
unregulated and apart from some independent and
professional association’s standard setting, to our
knowledge there is no commonly accepted and regu-
lated code of conduct, especially in the arena of small
and midsized companies. Hence, evidence for
engagement bias among valuators should trigger the
attention of policy makers as well as professional
associations, with ensuing efforts to mitigate the risk
of engagement bias in this area. Such efforts will be
particularly timely considering the widespread dis-
tress among business in the aftermath of the
COVID-19 pandemic and the important role that
business valuations play in determining whether a
company still represents sufficient value after a
restructuring and/or turnaround.
The present studies
To investigate the extent to which business valuators
are affected by engagement bias and anchoring bias
we designed two experimental studies. In study 1
participants were assigned to the condition in which
they represented either the buyer or the seller in a
transaction, and in which they were presented with
either a high or low anchor. Hence, there were four
different conditions (i.e., buyer/low anchor, buyer/
high anchor, seller/low anchor, seller/high anchor).
In the study, participants were asked to provide a
second opinion on an existing valuation report that
was presented in a compressed manner. We asked
for a second opinion on a compressed valuation
report as it was unfeasible to ask participants to con-
duct a full valuation or to assess a full valuation
report considering the time constraints imposed by
limitations in participants’ availability. Conducting
second opinions, nonetheless, is common practice in
the valuation industry and often a first step of an in-
depth valuation analysis. In study 2 we replicated the
first study to verify whether the original findings
hold true when the valuation report is created by an
independent valuator, rather than by a valuator who
represents the interests of the opposing party, ultim-
ately providing further evidence for the robustness of
the observed effects.
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Study 1 - method
Participants
For this study, 203 business valuation specialists were
recruited via e-mail. We targeted the world’s leading
valuation and corporate finance firms to ensure a sam-
ple of highly experienced business valuation experts. For
17 participants, no data was recorded as they failed to
pass an attention check, leaving a final sample of 186
participants. Of the final sample, 165 were male (81.3%),
the average age was 46.4 (SD¼ 13.2), and the average
years of experience in their profession was 17.9
(SD¼ 10.70). Further, 85 (45.7%) had a post-master
degree in accounting, 160 (86.0%) were enrolled or had
been enrolled in a specialized business valuation course,
and 123 (66.1%) had a post-master degree in business
valuation. When asked about their primary focus in their
work, 113 (60.8%) indicated that business valuation was
the primary focus, 57 participants (30.6%) answered
M&A, and 16 participants (8.6%) answered accounting;
175 participants (94.1%) indicated that they conduct or
are involved in business valuations on a regular basis.
In total, 28 different nationalities are represented in
the sample. The five countries with the most participants
are the USA with 58 participants (31.4%), the
Netherlands with 43 (23.3%), Canada with 23 (12.4%),
Italy with 10 (5.4%), and South Africa with 8 participants
(4.3%). A complete overview of the participants’ national-
ities can be found in Section 1 of the supplementary
materials available online. For 107 participants (52.7%),
English was their native language. The non-native English
speakers indicated on a 7-point Likert scale whether they
understood the questions and experienced no difficulties
in answering the questions, ranging from “Strongly dis-
agree” (1) to “Strongly agree” (7)(M¼ 6.32, SD¼ 0.97).
Experimental design
All participants were presented with the same business
case (apart from the manipulated variations) and sum-
mary of the corresponding valuation report. The current
study used a 2 2 between subjects factorial design, with
Anchor (low value anchor vs. high value anchor) and
Client (seller vs. buyer) as factors. Participants were ran-
domly assigned to either the role of the valuator repre-
senting the buyer in the transaction, or of the valuator
representing the seller. The value of the company as
determined by a DCF analysis was presented as EUR
4.435 million in the low value anchor condition and EUR
14.324 million in the high value anchor condition.
Procedure
Participants were first presented with a brief introduc-
tion stating that the purpose of the survey was to
investigate judgment and decision-making processes in
the context of business valuation. Next, participants
were asked to answer questions aimed to measure their
locus of strategic control, which is the extent to which
participants believe the success of a company is a mat-
ter of luck or the result of factors beyond an entrepre-
neur’s control (i.e., external locus) or rather that
success is a matter of careful strategic planning and
that luck has nothing to do with it (i.e., internal locus).
The locus of strategic control scale was incorporated
because previous research has shown that this factor is
correlated with perceived decline (Musteen, Liang, and
Barker 2011) and we wanted to control for this.
Next participants were presented with the business
case, followed by an attention check to make sure suf-
ficient time was spent going through the case and the
instructions. If the attention check was completed suc-
cessfully, participants were then presented with the
assignment as well as a summary of the valuation
report. Before participants were asked about their
opinion on the valuation report, several questions
were asked to measure the perceived decline of the
business. Next, participants were asked to give their
opinion on the valuation outcome and to indicate
whether they would adjust the valuation upwards or
downwards (measured on a 7-point Likert scale) and
in which range they believed the true value of the
company laid. These three variables (i.e., degree of
adjustment, lower bound of the range, upper bound
of the range) served as the key dependent variables.
Participants were asked to indicate which elements
of the valuation report they believed needed to be
adjusted and to motivate their decisions regarding the
adjustment of the valuation outcome. Next, partici-
pants were asked whether or not they would recom-
mend their client to do the transaction at the value
indicated in the valuation report. The final two ques-
tions regarding the case aimed to measure ‘bias blind
spot’, which is the tendency to recognize and acknow-
ledge biases affecting other people’s judgments, while
failing to recognize the potential influence of biases in
one’s own judgments (Pronin, Lin, and Ross 2002).
After the questions pertaining to the case, participants
indicated whether English was their native language
and, if not, to what extent they understood the case
and subsequent questions. Finally, participants were
presented with several demographical questions as
well as questions about their professional background.
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Materials and measurements
Business case
Participants were first presented with a brief introduc-
tion of the case and their role in it. For all partici-
pants these instructions stated they would be
presented with a real-life case of a company (here-
after: ‘the Company’) in decline that required new
capital to perform a turnaround, and for which a pri-
vate equity firm (hereafter: ’PE firm’) was interested
in investing in this company. For participants in the
“seller” condition, the instructions then stated that
the PE firm hired a valuator to determine the value of
the Company, but that the management of the
Company believed the resulting valuation to be way
too low and suspected the PE firm wanted to buy new
shares cheap and was too skeptical about the
Company’s future. Therefore, the Company wanted to
hire a valuator themselves for a quick, high level
review. Participants were asked to adopt the perspec-
tive of the valuator hired by the Company to conduct
that high-level review and to have a critical look at
the forecast and assumptions made by the PE Firm.
In contrast, participants in the “buyer” condition
received instruction stating that the Company hired a
valuator and that the PE-firm considered the resulting
valuation to be way too high and suspected the man-
agement of the Company was too optimistic about the
Company’s future. Consequently, the PE-firm wanted
to hire a valuator themselves for a quick, high level
review and participants were asked to adopt the per-
spective of that valuator. For all participants it was
emphasized that the case was described in a somewhat
concise manner and was aimed toward simulating a
situation in which they are approached last minute for
a quick, high level review and have limited time and
information. Please find the full instructions in Section
2 of the supplementary material available online.
Next, participants were presented with the full case.
The case described a Dutch advertisement and mar-
keting agency (“Flagship”) that created large scale
marketing campaigns for reputable brands. As a result
of declining sales and increasing costs, both the oper-
ating result and net income of the company were
negative. The company struggled to make the transi-
tion toward online and technology driven product
offerings, for a large part due to its outdated image.
As a result, the company would soon face bankruptcy.
The company required new capital to finance a turn-
around, but the shareholders had already invested a
lot in the past and their funds had now dried up.
Therefore, alternative financing options were explored
and through a reputable M&A advisor a private equity
firm expressed interest in investing in the company.
Both parties (i.e., the company and the PE firm)
agreed that a strong turnaround plan needed to be
developed. The CEO and his team defined a roadmap
to profitability by increasing sales, reducing costs, effi-
cient management of working capital, and making
(catch-up) investments (i.e. operational expenditures).
Here, the first part of the case ended. The details of
the turnaround plan as well as the full case can be
found in Section 3 of the supplementary materials.
Attention check
Considering the importance for the current study that
participants knew exactly who their client was and
what their client’s opinion was regarding the valuation
outcome, we incorporated an attention check. Three
simple multiple-choice questions were posed: (1) Who
is your client, (2) In what industry does the Company
operate, (3) What is your client’s opinion toward the
valuation outcome? If the participant answered one or
more questions incorrectly, they were offered a second
chance to read the case. After the second reading of
the case, participants were again presented with the
same three questions. If all three were answered cor-
rectly, participants could continue with the survey. If
one or more of the questions was again answered
incorrectly, participants were informed they could
not continue.
Assignment and valuation report
After having read the case and successfully completed
the attention check, participants were presented with
the second part of the case, which contained the
assignment and the valuation report. For participants
in both conditions, the position of their client regard-
ing the valuation outcome (i.e., too low or too high)
was reiterated and they were again asked to provide a
quick, high level review of the valuation conducted by
the opposing party. We chose to only include the key
elements of the valuation (rather than a full report)
and to frame the assignment as a “quick, high level
review” primarily due to the time-constraints of the
participants. That is, it would not have been feasible
to ask participants to generate or asses a complete
valuation report from scratch as this would require a
large commitment. Nonetheless, the current set-up of
a high-level review based on an existing valuation
report represents a realistic scenario that professional
business valuators are frequently faced with. The gen-
eralizability of the current context to a situation in
which a valuator conducts a full valuation from
scratch are addressed in the general discussion.
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The valuation resulted in either EUR 4.435M (in
the low value anchor condition) or EUR 14.324M (in
the high value anchor condition). Each report
included (1) a P&L statement, (2) an overview of net
working capital, and (3) an overview of tangible fixed
assets and investments. All three were provided for
the past four years (2014–2017) and forecasted for the
next seven years (2018–2024). Additionally, a balance
sheet was included, an overview of the cost of capital,
the main valuation assumptions, a graph depicting the
net sales and EBITDA over the 2014–2024 period,
and the final DCF analysis. The graph of the low
value anchor report depicted a moderate increase in
sales and EBITDA, whereas the graph for the high
value anchor report showed the typical hockey stick
projection with steep increases in sales and EBITDA.
The full valuation reports as presented to the partici-
pants can be found in Section 4 (low value anchor)
and Section 5 (high value anchor) of the supplemen-
tary materials available online.
Primary dependent variables
Valuation adjustment
Participants were asked to indicate on a 7-point Likert
scale to what extend they would adjust the valuation
outcome upwards, downwards, or keep the outcome
as it is. The scale ranged from “Adjust heavily down-
wards” (1) to “Adjust heavily upwards” (7), with the
midpoint (4) labeled as “Remain as it is”.
Valuation range
Realizing it is difficult to provide a specific adjustment
of the valuation, we asked participants to indicate a
range within which they believed the enterprise value
of the Company laid. Participants used two sliders to
indicate what they believed the minimum value
should be (slider 1) and what the maximum valuation
should be (slider 2). Both sliders had a maximum
range of EUR 0-20M and were presented on the same
screen. The lower bound of the range (i.e., the min-
imum value) and the upper bound of the range (i.e.,




Below the sliders used the indicate the valuation
range, participants were presented with a list of eight
components of the valuation report and were asked to
indicate which elements they believed needed to be
adjusted. Participants had to indicate at least one but
could choose more than one option. The eight ele-
ments were: (1) net sales, (2) EBITDA, (3) CAPEX,
(4) net working capital, (5) cost of capital, (6) the
length of the forecast period, (7) residual value, and
(8) “other”. The answers were subjected to descriptive
analyses only and will for brevity purposes not be dis-
cussed in this paper. The results can be found in
Section 6 of the supplementary materials online.
Adjustment motivation
Participants were asked to motivate their answers to
the questions pertaining to the adjustment of the valu-
ation outcome and the elements of the valuation. This
allowed us to observe whether some participants were
possibly aware of the influence a client might have on
their judgment (i.e., engagement bias) as well as the
potential anchoring effect of being presented with a
figure prior to evaluating a valuation object. In other
words, were participants consciously aware of the
potential anchoring effects and engagement bias
(albeit unlikely to be defined as such) or do these
biases affect a valuator’s judgments largely in an
unconscious manner?
Perceived decline
Seven questions together aimed to capture the per-
ceived decline of the business and included items such
as “Despite the poor performance of the last few
years, Flagship has the means to resolve the challenges
presented by its environment” and “Flagship will
likely fail any day and declare bankruptcy”. The com-
plete list of all seven items can be found in Section 7
of the supplementary materials. Participants answered
on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from “Strongly dis-
agree” (1) to “Strongly agree” (7). Items were recoded
such that a higher score indicated the participants
perceived the decline as more severe. The seven items
were derived from the 18-item scale used by Musteen,
Liang, and Barker (2011), which the authors largely
based on the work of Jackson and Dutton (1988). The
Cronbach’s alpha in the Musteen, Liang, and Barker
(2011) study for all 18 items was .75. In the current
study the Cronbach’s alpha for the seven items
was .74.
Recommendation
Participants were asked to what extent they would
recommend their client to do the transaction at the
value as listed in the valuation report. Participants
answered on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from
“Definitely not” (1) to “Definitely yes” (7).
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Bias blind spot
Participants were asked whether they believed the
valuator hired by the opposing party was affected in
her/his judgments because of the interests of their cli-
ent and whether they believed they themselves were




Considering the unequal distribution of males and
females in the current sample (165 men, 21 females),
gender was entered as a control variable to account
for any differences that might arise as a result.
Locus of strategic control
The locus of control strategic scale was incorporated
because previous research has shown that this factor
predicts perceived decline (Musteen, Liang, and
Barker 2011) and we wanted to control for this.
Similar to the Musteen, Liang, and Barker (2011)
study, we based the locus of strategic control items on
the work of Hodgkinson (1992) who created and vali-
dated this scale (see also Ritchie, Anthony, and
Rubens 2004; Ritchie and Sherlock 2009). However,
instead of the 16 items used in these previous studies,
who only incorporated 10 of the items in our scale
(which were selected based on the fit with the current
context) to reduce the time required to complete the
scale. The scale included items such as “Market
opportunities in an industry are largely determined by
factors beyond a company’s control”, or “Many of the
problems experienced by businesses can be avoided
through careful planning and analysis”. Please see
Section 8 of the supplementary materials for the com-
plete scale. Participants answered on a 7-point Likert
scale ranging from “Strongly disagree” (1) to “Strongly
agree” (7). Items were recoded such that a higher
score indicated a more external locus of stra-
tegic control.
Musteen, Liang, and Barker (2011) obtained a
Cronbach’s alpha of .72, whereas within our sample
the internal consistency was .51. An exploratory factor
analysis identified three factors based on Eigenvalues
above 1. Combined these three factors explained 34%
of the variance. However, the items belonging to the
three factors did not clearly represent subcomponents
of locus of strategic control, which is why we averaged
all the items as a single scale. Still, given the low
internal consistency it remains uncertain whether
combined the items measured a single construct.
Hence, the results pertaining to this control variable
should be interpreted with caution.
Maturity
Another variable that has been shown to be associated
with perceived decline is maturity, in previous
research defined as a combination of age, experience
and whether or not someone was pursuing an execu-
tive MBA (Musteen, Liang, and Barker 2011). In the
current research we included both age and experience
as separate control variables.
Results
Data preparation
Considering the importance of reading the case thor-
oughly and having a good understanding of the busi-
ness’ current situation and future prospects,
participants who spent less than 45 seconds reading
the case were excluded from analyses. Reading the
case consisting of 648 words within 45 seconds would
require a reading speed of 21.2 standard deviations (1
SD¼ 30 words/minute) above the average reading
speed (M¼ 228 words/minute) in the English lan-
guage (Trauzettel-Klosinski and Dietz 2012). As a
result of this criterion, 7 participants were excluded
from further analyses, leaving a final sample size
of 179.3
Anchoring and engagement bias
First, we conducted a Multivariate Analysis of
Covariance (MANCOVA). The variables anchor (low
vs. high value) and client (seller vs. buyer) were
entered as independent variables, and gender, age,
years of experience, and locus of strategic control as
control variables. For the dependent variables we
included the valuation adjustment, valuation range
(lower bound and upper bound as separate variables),
perceived decline, and the final recommendation.
Results showed that there were significant main
effects for anchor, F(5, 167) ¼ 72.30, p < .001, gp2 ¼
.68, and client, F(5, 167) ¼ 56.87, p < .001, gp2 ¼ .63,
as well as a non-hypothesized interaction effect
between these two variables, F(5, 167) ¼ 2.97, p ¼
.014, gp
2 ¼ .08. Table 1 shows the Pearson correlations
for the included variables and Table 2 shows the
results of the MANCOVA. This table also contains
the results of the model without the covariates.
Subsequent univariate analyses showed that the
main effect for anchor was only significant for the
variables measuring the lower bound of the value
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range, F(1, 171) ¼ 60.62, p < .001, gp2 ¼ .26, and the
upper bound of the value range, F(1, 171) ¼ 181.19, p
< .001, gp
2 ¼ .51. Specifically, participants in the low
value anchor condition gave a lower value for the
lower bound of the value range (M¼ 2.26, SD¼ 1.48)
than participants in the high value condition did
(M¼ 5.83, SD¼ 4.40). For the upper bound the same
pattern emerged, as the average value for the upper
bound indicated by participants in the low value
anchor condition was lower (M¼ 3.82, SD¼ 1.66)
than the value indicated by participants in the high
value anchor condition. (M¼ 10.06, SD¼ 4.59). No
such anchoring bias in valuators’ judgments was
found for the variable measuring the valuation adjust-
ment in qualitative terms (F¼ 1.14), perceived decline
(F< 1), or the final recommendation (F< 1).
The main effect for client was significant for the
variables measuring the adjustment of the valuation
qualitatively, F(1, 171) ¼ 53.74, p < .001, gp2 ¼ .24,
the lower bound of the value range, F(1, 171) ¼
20.85, p < .001, gp
2 ¼ .11, the upper bound of the
value range, F(1, 171) ¼ 37.71, p < .001, gp2 ¼ .18,
and for the final recommendation, F(1, 171) ¼ 212.74,
p < .001, gp
2 ¼ .55. For the valuation adjustment, par-
ticipants representing the buyer believed the valuation
should be adjusted downwards more heavily
(M¼ 1.89, SD¼ 0.79), than participants representing
the seller (the Company) (M¼ 3.17, SD¼ 1.38), as can
be seen in Figure 1. Likewise, those representing the
buyer indicated a lower value for the lower bound of
the valuation range (M¼ 2.93, SD¼ 3.03) than those
representing the seller (M¼ 5.16, SD¼ 4.03). The
same was true for the upper bound, where those rep-
resenting the buyer gave a lower value for the upper
bound (M¼ 5.49, SD¼ 3.75) than those representing
the seller (M¼ 8.36, SD¼ 4.59).
The interaction effect between anchor and client
was significant for the lower and upper bounds of the
valuation range. Analyses decomposing these inter-
action effects showed that for the lower bound of the
valuation range, the effect of client was significant
both for the low value anchor, F(1, 88) ¼ 36.08, p <
.001, gp
2 ¼ .29, and for the high value anchor, F(1, 87)
¼ 10.84, p ¼ .001, gp2 ¼ .11, but that the effect was
significantly larger for the former (although both
effect sizes can be considered large in magnitude;
Cohen 1988). For the upper bound of the valuation
Table 1. Pearson correlations for the independent variables, dependent variables, and control variables of study 1.
M SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.
1. Anchor (0 ¼ Low, 1 ¼ High) – .01 .07 .48 .67 .02 .04 .06 .00 .04 .03
2. Client (0 ¼ GEP, 1 ¼ Company) – .50 .30 .31 .07 .75 .17 .06 .06 .08
3. Adjustment 2.53 1.29 – .50 .49 .23 .32 .14 .07 .07 .04
4. Value lower bound 4.04 3.72 – .78 .23 .28 .13 .10 .08 .07
5. Value upper bound 6.92 4.65 – .16 .28 .13 .09 .11 .06
6. Perceived Decline 4.48 .82 – .06 .14 .12 .10 .08
7. Recommendation 3.62 2.09 – .15 .10 .07 .06
8. Gender (0 ¼ M, 1 ¼ F) – .13 .11 .07
9. Age 46.17 12.86 – .84 .03
10. Experience 18.09 10.65 – .00
11. Locus of Strategic Control 3.15 .58 –
Table 2. Results of the MANOVA and MANCOVA of Study 1
(i.e., with and without the control variables entered in
the model).
Independent Variables F(5, 171) p gp
2 F(5, 167) p gp
2
Anchor 73.83 <.001 .68 72.30 <.001 .68
Client 60.08 <.001 .64 56.87 <.001 .63
Anchor  Client 2.72 .022 .07 2.97 .014 .08
Control variables
Gender 0.61 .69 .02
Age 0.63 .67 .02
Experience 0.43 .83 .01
Locus of Strategic Control 1.73 .13 .05
Figure 1. Average valuation adjustment for participants of
Study 1 in the low value and high value anchor condition, sep-
arated by client (buyer vs. seller).
Note: Scores below to midpoint (4) indicate adjustments
downwards and scores above the midpoint indicate adjust-
ments upwards.
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range, the same pattern emerged. That is, the effect
of client was significant both for the low value
anchor, F(1, 88) ¼ 37.82, p < .001, gp2 ¼ .30, and
for the high value anchor, F(1, 87) ¼ 20.84, p <
.001, gp
2 ¼ .19, but again the effect was larger for
the former. The observation that the effect size was
larger for the low value anchor in both the lower
bound and upper bound was largely driven by the
smaller amount of variance in the low value anchor
relative to the high value anchor. The mean
differences were actually larger for the high value
anchors (2.90 for the lower bound and 4.02 for the
upper bound) than for the low value anchors (1.59
for the lower bound and 1.81 for the upper bound).
The reduced amount of variance in the low value
anchor condition can perhaps be explained by a
floor effect, given that the anchor was at the bottom
end of the scale and the responses clustered around
that anchor, which can clearly be seen in Figure 2
that depicts the average values for both the upper
and lower bound, and for both levels of the anchor
and client variable.
Notably, no effects of anchor or client were found
for perceived decline. Rather, it appears that all partic-
ipants converged with respect to the perceived decline
of the business (see Figure 4). This is noteworthy as it
suggests that the observed biases exist despite the fact
that participants across the conditions viewed the eco-
nomic state of the company roughly the same.
With respect to the final recommendation, as can
be seen in Figure 3, the data show that participants
representing the buyer generally recommended their
client to not go forward with the transaction as indi-
cated by an average score below the midpoint of the
scale (M¼ 2.02, SD¼ 1.25). Participants representing
the seller, however, generally recommended their cli-
ent to do the deal at the initial value (i.e., the anchor)
(M¼ 5.22, SD¼ 1.50). The level of the anchor (i.e.,
low vs. high value) did not interact with the client
variable (F< 1), suggesting that irrespective of the
value presented in the valuation report, participants
believed the deal was an attractive one for the seller
but much less so for the buyer.
Figure 2. Individual data points of Study 1 for the dependent variables measuring the lower bound (left pane) and upper bound
(right pane) of the indicated valuation range, for participants in the buyer condition (purple circles) and seller condition (blue trian-
gles), separated by the value of the anchor (low value vs. high value).
Note: The two horizontal dotted lines represent the value of the high anchor (14.324M) and the low anchor (4.435M) as presented
in the valuation report.
Figure 3. Individual data points of perceived decline for partic-
ipants representing the buyer (purple circles) or seller (blue tri-
angles) with the averages and error bars per anchor and
condition indicated by the horizontal black lines.
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Bias blind spot
Whereas 58.7% believed the valuator representing the
opposing party was biased, only 25.1% believed they
themselves were biased. Interestingly, when decom-
posing these figures based on who the valuators repre-
sented, 78.9% of the participants representing the
buyer (i.e., GEP, the PE-firm) believed the valuator
hired by the seller (the Company) was biased, whereas
‘only’ 38.2% of the participants representing the seller
believed the valuator hired by the buyer was biased.
When reflecting on their own potential biases, 32.2%
of the participants representing the buyer indicated
they suspected they were affected by their client’s inter-
ests, whereas only 18.0% of the participants represent-
ing the seller believed they were biased as a result of
their client’s interests. Hence, the data provide evidence
for the existence of a bias blind spot, meaning partici-
pants recognized the potential biasing effect that repre-
senting the interests of a certain client might have on
others, while generally failing to acknowledge the
potential bias in their own judgments.
Discussion study 1
Study 1 set out to examine whether valuators can be
influenced by factors that should not have any bearing
on their assessment of a company’s value or of other
valuations. We found clear evidence for the existence
of both anchoring bias and engagement bias. That is,
when valuators are confronted with a valuation report
and are asked to indicate in what range they believe
the true value of the company lays, they use the initial
value as an anchor and indicate a higher range in case
of a higher anchor, and a lower range in case of a
lower anchor. Also, valuators appear to be affected by
their clients’ interests, such that they indicate that a
valuation should be adjusted in accordance with their
clients’ interests. Specifically, when they represent a
buyer and therefore have an incentive to lower the
value of the shares, they also indicate the valuation
should be adjusted downwards more heavily and also
indicate a lower value range for the true value of the
company. The opposite is the case when they repre-
sented the seller. Combined, these data show that par-
ticipants did not so much disagree on the fact that the
forecasts were too optimistic and that it needed to be
adjusted downwards, but rather by how much. The
question by how much the valuation needed to be
adjusted downwards appeared to be largely deter-
mined by the anchor and the interests of the client
that the valuator represented. These effects seem to be
unrelated to the valuators’ perceptions regarding the
degree of decline of the company. Hence, despite con-
verging views on the economic state of the valuation
object, valuators still suggest adjusting the valuation in
accordance with their client’s interest and they stay
relatively close to the initial value (i.e., the anchor).
Importantly, however, an alternative explanation
can be put forward for the observed engagement bias.
Rather than being affected by their clients’ interests, it
could be that the valuators in Study 1 distrusted the
accuracy of the valuation report since they believed
the valuator hired by the opposing party was biased as
a result of their client’s interest, and that they there-
fore adjusted the valuation accordingly to compensate
for this fact. Such a process is called reactive devalu-
ation, which entails that proposals or arguments are
devalued by a party due to the mere fact that they
were put forward by an opposing party (Ross, et al.
1995; Ross and Stillinger 1991). This alternative
explanation would be in line with the finding that the
majority of the respondents indeed believed the valu-
ator representing the opposing party was biased, par-
ticularly when this other valuator represented the
company. Hence, it is important to investigate
whether the findings of Study 1 hold true when the
valuation report was created by an independent valu-
ator, rather than by a valuator who represents the
interests of the opposing party. If the same effects are
found, this would rule out the possibility that the val-
uators in Study 1 were distrustful toward the valuation
Figure 4. Average recommendations scores in Study 1 for
each anchor, separated by client condition.
Note: Scores below the midpoint (4) indicate the participants
would not recommend their client to go forward with the
transaction, and scores above the midpoint indicate the partici-
pants would recommend their client to do the deal.
12 M. J. R. BROEKEMA ET AL.
report due to the fact that it was made by someone
representing the opposing party, thereby providing
further evidence that engagement bias can account for
the observed findings in Study 1.
Study 2 aimed to do exactly that and had two spe-
cific goals. First, Study 2 aimed to replicate the find-
ings of Study 1 to provide more robust evidence for
the observed findings. Second, it aimed to test
whether the reactive devaluation hypothesis can
account for the observed engagement bias found in
Study 1, or whether participants were indeed affected
by their clients’ interests.
Study 2 method
Participants
In total, 160 business valuation specialists, none of
whom also participated in Study 1, were recruited via
e-mail. Of this group, 15 participants (9.4%) did not
pass the attention check, meaning the final sample
consisted of 145 participants. We again targeted the
world’s leading valuation and corporate finance firms
to ensure a sample of highly experienced business
valuation experts. Of the final sample, 119 were male
(82.1%), the average age was 43.4 (SD¼ 14.2), and the
average years of experience in their profession was
16.3 (SD ¼ 11.1). Sixty-one (42.1%) had a post-master
degree in accounting, 118 (81.4%) were enrolled or
had been enrolled in a specialized business valuation
course, 83 (57.2%) had a post-master degree in busi-
ness valuation, 98 (67.6%) indicated that business
valuation was their primary focus in their work, for
40 participants (27.6%) this was M&A, and for 7 par-
ticipants (4.8%) this was accounting; 125 participants
(86.2%) indicated that they conduct or are involved in
business valuations on a regular basis.
In total, 28 different nationalities are represented in
the sample. The five countries with the most partici-
pants are the USA with 50 participants (34.5%),
Canada with 22 (15.2%), Italy with 12 (8.3%),
Germany with 8 (5.5%) and the United Kingdom with
6 participants (4.1%). A complete overview of the par-
ticipants’ nationalities can be found in Section 9 of
the supplementary materials available online. For 107
participants (62.8%), English was their native lan-
guage. The non-native English speakers indicated on a
7-point Likert scale whether they understood the
questions and experienced no difficulties in answering
the questions, ranging from “Strongly disagree” (1) to
“Strongly agree” (7) (M¼ 6.20, SD¼ 1.22).
Design, procedure, and measurements
Study 2 was identical to Study 1 apart from one cru-
cial aspect. In Study 1 it said in both the introduction
of the case as well as in the assignment that “To
determine the value of the Company, [the Company/
the PE firm] hired a valuator”. In Study 2, the intro-
duction of the case stated: “To determine the value of
the Company, both parties agreed to hire an inde-
pendent valuator”, and the assignment stated: “To
evaluate the possible entrance of GEP as a new share-
holder and to anticipate a possible dilution discussion,
the Company and PE firm hired an independent valu-
ation firm to conduct a DCF-valuation of the
Company, taking into account the effects of the turn-
around plan”. Hence, the participants of Study 2 knew
that the valuation report they were going to evaluate
was made by an independent valuator who therefore
could not have been affected by any stakehold-
er’s interests.
The Cronbach alphas were .62 for the locus of




Based on the same criterion as in Study 1, seven par-
ticipants were excluded from further analyses, leaving
a final sample of 138.4
Table 3. Pearson correlations for the independent variables, dependent variables, and control variables of study 2.
M SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.
1. Anchor (0 ¼ Low, 1 ¼ High) – .03 .29 .41 .66 .18 .04 .20 .08 .04 .02
2. Client (0 ¼ GEP, 1 ¼ Company) – .41 .23 .23 .10 .69 .06 .02 .01 .07
3. Adjustment 2.64 1.24 – .44 .26 .22 .36 .09 .15 .14 .27
4. Value lower bound 4.11 3.62 – .70 .18 .20 .01 .07 .10 .11
5. Value upper bound 7.68 4.50 – .02 .22 .10 .01 .15 .12
6. Perceived Decline 4.28 .83 – .05 .06 .17 .12 .08
7. Recommendation 3.63 1.81 – .06 .06 .08 .09
8. Gender (0 ¼ M, 1 ¼ F) – .21 .20 .09
9. Age 43.43 14.06 – .85 .00
10. Experience 16.29 10.81 – .03
11. Locus of Strategic Control 3.20 .66 –
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Anchoring and engagement bias
We again conducted a MANCOVA and the results
showed that there were significant main effects for
anchor, F(5, 174) ¼72.91, p < .001, gp2 ¼ .68, and cli-
ent, F(5, 174) ¼62.74, p < .001, gp2 ¼ .64, as well as
interaction effect between these two variables, F(5,
174) ¼3.13, p ¼ .010, gp2 ¼ .08. Table 3 shows the
Pearson correlations and Table 4 shows the results of
the MANCOVA.
The main effect for anchor was significant for the
variables measuring the valuation adjustment, F(1,
130) ¼ 15.41, p < .001, gp2 ¼ .11, the lower bound of
the value range, F(1, 130) ¼ 30.05, p < .001, gp2 ¼
.19, the upper bound of the value range, F(1, 130) ¼
118.51, p < .001, gp
2 ¼ .48, and the perceived decline,
F(1, 130) ¼ 4.00, p ¼ .048, gp2 ¼ .03. Participants
believed the valuation should be adjusted downwards
more heavily in the high value anchor condition
(M¼ 2.30, SD¼ 1.22) than in the low value anchor
condition (M¼ 3.02, SD¼ 1.17), which is shown in
Figure 5. Replicating Study 1, participants in the low
value anchor condition gave a lower value for the
lower bound of the value range (M¼ 2.54, SD¼ 1.21)
than participants in the high value anchor condition
did (M¼ 5.50, SD¼ 4.42). Also replicating Study 1,
the average value for the upper bound indicated by
participants in the low value anchor condition was
lower (M¼ 4.53, SD¼ 1.45) than the value indicated
by participants in the high value anchor condition.
(M¼ 10.48, SD¼ 4.45). In contrast to Study 1, an
effect of anchor was found for the perceived decline.
Participants in the low value anchor condition per-
ceived the decline as slightly less severe (M¼ 4.12,
SD¼ 0.85) than participants in the high value anchor
condition, (M¼ 4.42, SD¼ 0.79), which can be seen in
Figure 7. No effect for anchor was found for the final
recommendation (F< 1).
Fully replicating Study 1, the main effect for client
was significant for the variables measuring the adjust-
ment of the valuation qualitatively, F(1, 130) ¼ 30.23,
p < .001, gp
2 ¼ .19, the lower bound of the value
range, F(1, 130) ¼ 6.44, p ¼ .012, gp2 ¼ .05, the upper
bound of the value range, F(1, 130) ¼ 12.48, p ¼ .001,
gp
2 ¼ .09, and for the final recommendation, F(1, 130)
¼ 120.36, p < .001, gp2 ¼ .48. For the valuation adjust-
ment, participants representing the buyer believed the
valuation should be adjusted downwards more heavily
(M¼ 2.09, SD¼ 0.87), than participants representing
the seller (M¼ 3.11, SD¼ 1.33), which is shown in
Figure 6. Similarly, those representing the buyer indi-
cated a lower value for the lower bound of the valu-
ation range (M¼ 3.23, SD¼ 2.30) than those
representing the seller (M¼ 4.87, SD¼ 4.34). For the
upper bound, those representing the buyer gave a lower
value for the upper bound (M¼ 6.58, SD¼ 3.96) than
those representing the seller (M¼ 8.63, SD¼ 4.75).
Similar to Study 1, participants representing the seller
again recommended their client to go forward with the
deal (M¼ 4.78, SD¼ 1.47), whereas those representing
the buyer did not (M¼ 2.30, SD¼ 1.09). Hence, Study
2 provides further evidence for the existence of engage-
ment bias among valuation specialists.
The interaction effect between anchor and client
was significant only for the lower bound of the valu-
ation range, F(1, 130) ¼ 6.37, p ¼ .013, gp2 ¼ .05.
Analyses decomposing this interaction effect showed
that the effect of client was significant only for the
high value anchor, F(1, 71) ¼ 7.46, p ¼ .008, gp2 ¼
.10, but not for the low value anchor, F(1, 63) ¼ 0.87,
p ¼ .35, gp2 ¼ .01. Similar to Study 1, this interaction
effect seems to be an artifact of the study materials
Table 4. Results of the MANOVA and MANCOVA of Study 2
(i.e., with and without the control variables entered in
the model).
Independent Variables F(5, 130) p gp
2 F(5, 126) p gp
2
Anchor 59.66 <.001 .70 59.01 <.001 .70
Client 29.10 <.001 .53 28.97 <.001 .54
Anchor  Client 2.45 .037 .09 2.66 .025 .10
Control variables
Gender 0.52 .761 .02
Age 3.42 .006 .12
Experience 4.62 .001 .16
Locus of Strategic Control 2.94 .015 .10
Figure 5. Average valuation adjustment for participants in the
low value and high value anchor condition, separated by client
(buyer vs. seller).
Note: Scores below to midpoint (4) indicate adjustments
downwards and scores above the midpoint indicate adjust-
ments upwards.
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used. In Figure 6 it can be seen that there appears to
be a floor effect for the lower bound in the low value
anchor condition. Therefore, if a higher value were to
have been chosen for the low value anchor (i.e. fur-
ther away from the bottom end of the scale), it can
reasonably be expected that the client variable would
have had an effect here to.
For the final recommendation, participants repre-
senting the buyer recommended their client to not go
forward with the transaction as indicated by an
average score below the midpoint of the scale
(M¼ 2.34, SD¼ 1.13), whereas participants represent-
ing the seller recommended their client to do the deal
(M¼ 4.81, SD¼ 1.49), as can be seen in Figure 8.
Bias blind spot
Similar to Study 1, participants believed the independ-
ent valuator was biased more often (42.0%) than they
Figure 7. Individual data points of perceived decline for partic-
ipants representing the buyer (purple circles) or seller (blue tri-
angles) in Study 2, with the averages and error bars per
anchor and condition indicated by the horizontal black lines.
Figure 6. Individual data points for the dependent variables measuring the lower bound (left pane) and upper bound (right pane)
of the indicated valuation range, for participants of Study 2 in the buyer condition (purple circles) and seller condition (blue trian-
gles), separated by the value of the anchor (low value vs. high value).
Note: The two horizontal dotted lines represent the value of the high anchor (14.324M) and the low anchor (4.435M) as presented
in the valuation report.
Figure 8. Average recommendation scores in Study 2 for each
anchor, separated by client condition.
Note: Scores below the midpoint (4) indicate the participants
would not recommend their client to go forward with the
transaction, and scores above the midpoint indicate the partici-
pants would recommend their client to do the deal.
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believed themselves were biased (23.2%), again provid-
ing evidence for bias blind spot.
Discussion study 2
Study 2 replicated the key findings of Study 1, provid-
ing evidence for the robustness of anchoring bias and
engagement bias among valuation specialists.
Importantly, Study 2 aimed to test the extent to which
processes of reactive devaluation could account for
the observed engagement bias in Study 1. Considering
the fact that Study 2 again provided evidence for the
existence of engagement bias while the valuation
report under scrutiny was produced by an independ-
ent valuator (thereby nullifying potential reactive
devaluation), it is unlikely that reactive devaluation
processes can account for the observed effects. Rather,
it is more likely that the participants were in fact
biased in their judgments due to their clients’ inter-
ests. When comparing the effect sizes of Study 1 and
Study 2, the engagement bias in Study 1 appears to be
larger than in Study 2, suggesting that reactive devalu-
ation processes can possibly account for at least some
degree of the observed engagement bias in Study 1,
but this difference is not statistically significant.5
General discussion
Collectively, the two studies investigated the influence
of cognitive bias in a business valuation context. We
tested whether valuators are affected by anchoring
bias and engagement bias and found robust evidence
for both. Specifically, when valuators are presented
with an anchor (e.g., a valuation report conducted by
another valuator), their perceptions regarding the
value of a particular company are affected by the
anchor, such that relatively high anchors result in
higher valuations compared to when a relatively low
anchor is presented. Additionally, when valuators rep-
resent their client’s interest, this relationship affects
the valuator’s judgments such that these are more in
tune with their client’s wishes. If their client is looking
to sell and would therefore benefit from a high valu-
ation, the valuator indeed values the object higher
than when the valuator represents a buyer who would
benefit from a lower valuation.
Interestingly, when participants were asked to
motivate their answers regarding the adjustment of
the valuation, none of them hinted even vaguely
toward the potential influence of anchoring bias or
engagement bias. Also, the vast majority of partici-
pants in both studies self-reported they believed they
were not biased due to their client’s interest.
Therefore, we assume that these biases operate largely
in an unconscious fashion and that the participants
rationalized their intuitions regarding the company’s
value post-hoc. However, since we did not explicitly
measure awareness of the biases’ influence on the par-
ticipants’ judgments, we cannot draw strong conclu-
sions regarding the degree to which the observed
biases operate in an unconscious fashion.
Although we acknowledge that differences in valu-
ation outcomes can be partially explained by eco-
nomic concepts like subjectivity and utility theory,
and even that individual skills and experience of valu-
ators might play a role in explaining such differences,
we provide a first demonstration that cognitive biases
might play a prominent role in explaining differences
in valuation outcomes.
Theoretical and practical implications
The current research adds to the literature in the fol-
lowing ways. First, we have put forward a novel bias
that builds on previous work in the auditing literature
investigating self-serving biases in that context. The
notion that business valuators (or any professional for
that matter) are affected in their judgments following
from their clients’ interests is a bias we have called
engagement bias. The optimal condition for a valuator
is to have full professional autonomy when being
involved in a valuation engagement. However, in line
with the literature challenging the independence of
auditors, we demonstrated that due to engagement
bias, valuators’ professional judgments can be over-
shadowed by the urge to satisfy clients, ultimately
leading to suboptimal valuations, and possible even
liability claims for the valuator. Perhaps more worri-
some in light of the impending aftermath of the
COVID-19 pandemic, engagement bias ultimately
risks unduly liquidating economically viable compa-
nies when the liquidation value of a company is erro-
neously deemed higher than the going-concern value
after restructuring and/or turnaround, or contrastingly
the allocation of significant resources to save compa-
nies that in reality have little chance of surviving.
Second, the observation that valuators are affected
by anchoring bias is alarming as valuations should
ideally be constructed independent from any effects of
initially presented values and guiding information.
Without acknowledging the presence of anchoring
effects in valuation engagements, discussions about
value might start from an incorrect starting point,
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resulting in misevaluations, suboptimal investment
decisions and costly disputes.
There have been some inconsistencies in the litera-
ture regarding the extent to which experts are equally
affected by the two biases as lay people, and our
research adds to this body of research by demonstrating
that in our studies even highly trained experts suc-
cumbed to the biases’ effects. Notwithstanding this the-
oretical contribution to the literature, we consider this
paper’s contribution to lay with its implications for
practitioners and policy makers. That is, following these
findings, we encourage both academics and professio-
nals in the field of business valuation to pay increased
attention to the psychological factors affecting their
work. Despite the commonly heard catchphrase
“valuation is a craft, not a science” (e.g., Damodaran
2016), the clear focus in the valuation literature on valu-
ation techniques and associated inputs suggests valu-
ation is typically treated more as a science than an art.
We would encourage an increased focus on the psycho-
logical factors that can influence perceptions regarding
a valuation object and ultimately valuations. Although
we acknowledge that cognitive biases are hard to min-
imize or regulate, we advocate for an increased aware-
ness of the influence of biases in business valuations.
Discussions regarding the cause of large differences in
valuation outcomes can benefit from insights from
behavioral sciences, including the current research.
Limitations and future research
Some potential limitations of the current research
should be addressed. First, participants were presented
a compressed valuation report and were requested to
give a second opinion on a report from another valu-
ator. The question can be raised whether the observed
results would have been different when the partici-
pants were asked to reflect on a more comprehensive
valuation report or even to conduct a complete valu-
ation themselves. Nevertheless, practice demonstrates
that second opinions providing a quick analysis on a
valuation outcome are commonplace, suggesting the
current findings can at least be generalized to such
real-world situations. Moreover, it could even be that
providing a comprehensive valuation report or con-
ducting an own valuation would result in even stron-
ger effects than the ones found in the current study.
That is, if the manipulation used in the current study
(i.e., asking participants to adopt the perspective of
the valuator hired by either the Company or the PE-
firm) already caused participants to be biased due to
their client’s interest, it is not unreasonable to think
that in the real world, where the pressure to success-
fully complete an engagement and satisfy clients is
much more intensely felt, even larger effects might be
observed. Nonetheless, we would encourage future
research to investigate the current biases (as well as
other biases) in real-world business valuations.
Second, one can question whether we truly
observed anchoring effects, or whether the anchors
provided in the case were actually informative in
some way and in that sense it might actually have
been rational to rely on that information when evalu-
ating the presented valuation. Traditionally, anchoring
effects were studied in a laboratory setting where the
anchors were randomly generated and participants
were often aware of the irrelevant source of such
anchors (e.g., Englich, Mussweiler, and Strack 2006;
Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Wilson et al. 1996).
Since then, however, a large body of literature has
studied anchoring effects in more realistic settings
where the presented anchors did come from a credible
and relevant source. In jury decision making research
for example, it has repeatedly been demonstrated that
juries’ damages and sentences decisions are affected
by plaintiffs’ and prosecutors’ requests (e.g., Campbell
et al. 2016; Englich 2006; Englich and Mussweiler
2001; Marti and Wissler 2000). Even though plaintiffs
and prosecutors typically offer a legally grounded
motivation for their requests, juries should rely on
their own assessment of the facts of the case and the
nature of the crime, injury, or economic loss. Thus,
even though the presented anchors in such research is
nonrandom and perhaps even informative, juries
should still not rely on them when awarding damages
or making sentences decisions.
The same applies to the context of business valu-
ation. Even though another valuator might have con-
ducted a careful assessment of a company’s future
outlook and discounted its estimated future earnings
to the present value using the DCF-method, a valuator
asked to conduct a second opinion or to conduct a
new valuation from scratch should not rely on the
assumptions made by the initial valuator. It is pre-
cisely the business valuators who know that a DCF-
method is extremely sensitive to the assumptions used
in the equation. In our experiments, the valuation
experts were provided with details about the company,
the industry it operated in, its shareholders (and their
dispute), as well as detailed financial data concerning
the company’s historical performance. Based on these
data points, valuators ought to be able assess the com-
pany’s outlook and estimate its enterprise value.
Indeed, the client the participant represented nor the
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value of the anchor affected perceptions regarding the
decline of the business. Moreover, the anchor had no
effect on the degree to which the participants believed
the valuation should be adjusted in qualitative terms.
Thus, it seems that the participants all had similar
ideas (on average) about the state of the company and
its future outlook. However, when asked to provide a
range for the company’s enterprise value, the pre-
sented anchor clearly affected their judgments, sug-
gesting that we in fact observed the classic anchoring
effect. Nonetheless, we believe it would be worthwhile
to investigate whether valuation experts are affected
by anchors that stem from less credible and inform-
ative sources, such as a business owner that used a
simple multiple (e.g. 5x earnings) to base their expect-
ations on. Moreover, it might be the case that when
valuators are asked to conduct a valuation from
scratch, anchoring effects might be less pronounced
compared to when valuators conduct seconds opin-
ions as in our studies. However, considering the
prevalence of second opinions in the valuation land-
scape, it is worrisome that in these cases anchoring
effects bias valuators judgments, as this diminishes the
usefulness and credibility of second opinions.
We encourage future research to develop measures
that can mitigate the effects of biases that affect valuator’s
judgments. A first direction could be to enhance aware-
ness on this topic across valuators and stakeholders of
valuations. Incorporating knowledge of the effects of
both anchoring bias and engagement bias in valuation
education and training is a first step in mitigating these
effects in the long run. A second direction could be to
find ways that would allow valuators to conduct valua-
tions in a more isolated manner, free from the pressure
inherent to dependent client relationships, the purpose of
the valuation in relation to the outcome and the client’s
interest in the valuation. Finally, it might be worthwhile
to explore whether a protocol can be developed contain-
ing guidelines and principles geared toward reducing the
effects of biases in valuations, ultimately contributing to
the goal of creating more objective valuations and hence
reducing large differences in valuation outcomes.
Whereas auditors have seen intense scrutiny from regula-
tors, the domain of business valuation remains largely
unregulated. We believe that the presented research here
suggests that this industry too ought to be under closer
supervision by policy makers and regulators.
Notes
1. WACC (Weighted Average Cost of Capital), APV
(Adjusted Present Value), CFE (Cashflow to Equity).
2. For the purpose of this research we assume a company
and not an individual asset or a group of assets.
3. The 45 second cut-off was arbitrarily chosen and is
strongly conservative as a thorough comprehension of
the presented materials would require more time.
However, this criterion did not affect the findings as
similar p-values were found when 90 seconds or
180 seconds were used as cut-offs.
4. Similar to Study 1, the results of Study 2 did not differ
in any meaningful way when less lenient cut-off criteria
were used (e.g., 90 or 180 seconds).
5. The datasets of the two studies were combined and the
dependence of the valuator was added as a factor (0 ¼
dependent, 1 ¼ independent). When adding this factor
to the multivariate model, no interaction effect with
client, F(5, 309) ¼ 1.42, p ¼ .216, gp2 ¼ .02, nor a main
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